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Since the Breakup: Developments and

Divergences in ANCOM's and Chile's
Foreign Investment Codes
By MICHAEL G. THORNTON
Member of the class of 1984

I.

INTRODUCTION

The attitude of Latin American' countries toward foreign investment underwent substantial transformation during the 1950's and

1960's. This change reflected a growing awareness among Latin American nations that unrestricted foreign investment exploited the region
rather than contributed to its development.2 Exploitation, fear of dom-

ination by multinational corporations, and stunted national development provided impetus for attempts by these countries to play active
roles in determining the course of their national development. Some-

times the attempts translated into government expropriations, but often3
nations sought control by establishing strong regulatory structures.
The Andean Common Market (hereinafter ANCOM, Andean Pact, or
Andean Group), established in 1969 and comprised of Bolivia, Chile,

Columbia, Ecuador, Peru, and, later, Venezuela, 4 reacted to this altered
perception by enacting a common scheme regulating the treatment of
foreign investment referred to as Decision 24 (hereinafter D24, the
Code, or Andean Code).' This decision established tough restrictions
on the inflow of foreign investment to the region and its treatment once
1.Latin America, as used in this Note, refers to all the countries in the Western Hemisphere except the United States and the former British possessions.
2. Schill, The Mexican andAndean Investment Coder" An Overview and Comparison, 6
LAW & POL. INT'L Bus. 437, 437 (1974).

3. Id
4. The Andean Common Market was formed by the Agreement on Andean Subregional Integration, done, May 26, 1969, reprintedin 8 I.L.M. 910 (1969) [hereinafter cited as
Cartagena Agreement]. Venezuela was not an original signator of the Cartagena Agreement
but became a member in September 1973.
5. Common Regime of Treatment of Foreign Capital and of Trademarks, Patents,
Licenses, and Royalties, Decision No. 24 of the Commission of the Cartagena Agreement, as
amended November 30, 1976, reprintedin 16 I.L.M. 138 (1977) [hereinafter cited as D24).
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in the region. D24 manifested a new and innovative approach toward
foreign investment on a regional level, which, if successful over the
long run, could serve as a model for other regional groupings.
A crisis with Chile over D24's restrictions led to Chile's acrimonious withdrawal from ANCOM in 1976. Chile then implemented its
foreign investment statute, Decree Law 600 (hereinafter DL600 or the
Statute), 7 which emphasized the need for a large influx of foreign capital to promote Chile's development and economic recovery. The Statute's favorable treatment of foreign investment effectively repudiated
D24 and the assumptions about foreign investment that D24 manifested. A 1977 amendment to DL6001 further encouraged investors
and widened the philosophical chasm between Chile and its Andean
neighbors.
Chile's withdrawal raised fundamental questions about D24's future. ANCOM, demonstrating flexibility, answered some of the questions by amending key provisions of D24 9 and by establishing the
Andean Court of Justice. 1" The philosophical premises underlying
D24, however, survived the trauma induced by Chile's dramatic exit.
The two contradictory code schemes this Note focuses on provide
a contrast which illuminates the benefits and deficiencies of each code.
This Note will examine the developments in ANCOM's and Chile's
foreign investment laws since Chile withdrew from ANCOM.
ANCOM's restrictive yet flexible D24 will be compared with Chile's
DL600 and its 1977 amendment which opened the door to unrestricted
foreign investment. It will further discuss ANCOM's formation and
the ideas underpinning D24's role as ANCOM's cornerstone. Finally,
the recently established Andean Court of Justice and its potential impact on the development of regional norms for D24's application and
implementation will be analysed.
6. Articles on D24 include Daftino, TheAndean CodeAfter Five Years, 8 LAW. AM. 635
(1976); Lisocki, The Andean Foreign Investment Code, 49 NOTRE DAME LAW. 317 (1973);
Murphy, Decision24, Mexicanization,and the New Internation Order: The Analoty of Disincentive, 13 TEX. INT'L L.J. 289 (1977); Vargas-Hidalgo,.An Evaluation oftheAndean Pact, 10
LAW.AM. 401 (1978); Note, Andean ForeignInvestment Code: an Overview, 7 GA, J. INT'L &
COMP. L. 656 (1977); Note, PoliticalComponents andPracticalEffects of te Andean Foreign
Investment Colde, 27 STAN. L. REv. 1597 (1975).
7. Foreign Investment Statute, Decree-Law No. 600, July 13, 1974, reprinted it 13
I.L.M. 1176 (1974) [hereinafter cited as DL600].
8. Foreign Investment Statute, Decree-Law No. 1748, March 11, 1977, reprintedIn 17
I.L.M. 134 (1978) [hereinafter cited as DL1748].
9. See infra notes 72-73 and accompanying text.
10. Treaty Creating the Court of Justice of the Cartagena Agreement, done May 28,
1979, reprintedin 18 I.L.M. 1203 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Andean Court Treaty].
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ANCOM's alterations of D24 following Chile's withdrawal and
the subsequent establishment of an Andean Court of Justice have contributed to a more stable investment environment in the Andean nations. This stable environment has answered some of the concerns
expressed by investors who perceived D24's restrictions as a disincentive to investing in the region. To fully realize the goal of a stable
investment environment, however, the Andean Court of Justice must
ensure greater uniformity in D24's application and establish a set of
regional norms for D24's implementation.
A regional foreign investment code such as D24 provides a sound
method for introducing greater national control over development, for
lessening dependency on developed nations, and for still attracting
much needed foreign investment into the region. These goals potentially conflict, but a flexible approach toward revising D24 to meet exigencies that may arise, while maintaining D24's premises about foreign
investment, can bring these goals into balance.
Chile's withdrawal from ANCOM and its adoption of an "opendoor" policy toward foreign investment may hurt Chile's overall development. The open-door policy contributes to a re-establishment of the
ties of dependence to more developed nations which D24 sought to
eliminate. Foreign investors can thereby control important sectors of
the economy, and national control over the economy and over the
course of development may be subverted. Additionally, Chile's loss of
favorable access for its products to the ANCOM markets may have
contributed to the stunted growth of manufacturing industries in Chile.
Chile, with massive influxes of foreign investment, has developed instead those sectors of its economy best able to compete in the world
market, such as its extractive industries. This has produced a lopsided
development which requires Chile to import many manufactured
goods to meet the demands of its national market. This in turn exhausts foreign exchange reserves and contributes to economic
problems.
Although at present the political differences between Chile and
ANCOM remain irreconcilable, it is not inconceivable that a prolonged
economic crisis in Chile could cause Chile to reevaluate ANCOM and
seek to regain membership. To accommodate Chile ANCOM would
have to review D24 and possibly modify some key provisions. Undoubtedly, such moves by Chile and the Andean nations would arouse
new interest in D24 and its role in ANCOM.
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II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF ANCOM
ANCOM grew out of the disappointment of five Andean nations
with the Latin American Free Trade Association (hereinafter
LAFTA)." I LAFTA allocated the benefits of regional trade liberaliza-

tion to Mexico, Brazil, and Argentina (hereinafter the Big Three), the
nations with the largest markets and the most developed industrial sectors, at the expense of the smaller Andean nations. 12 Moreover,
LAFTA failed to adopt any provision regulating the flow of new direct
foreign investment into the common market. Most new foreign investment attracted by the prospect of preferential access to the common
market gravitated toward the Big Three.
By failing to regulate foreign investment, LAFTA had become a
"great open door to foreign monopolistic capital."' 13 Foreign investors
had gained an "enlarged duty-free market for their capital and technology." 4 LAFTA's tariff reductions benefited international corporations
to the detriment of the member countries.
To give but one example: the U. S. General Electric Corporation which previously was obliged to pay taxes to the Uruguayan or
Bolivian Governments in order to place its export products in these
markets, now pays nothing directly. Thanks to the LAFTA, this corporation exports its products duty-free through the General Electric
do Brasil ...All that has happened is the "integration" of foreign

capital with the weak economies of dependent countries, which in
turn are "integrated" by exporting an increasingly larger volume of
profits ...
To date, the Andean Pact-unlike the LAFTA-has been able to
resist externalpressurestoforce itinto the kind of integrationimperialism desires. And it is precisely Decision 24 that has given the Cartagena Agreement its progressive
nature and member countries their
5
capacity for self-protection.'

The dissatisfied Andean nations hoped that through ANCOM's crea11. See Treaty Establishing a Free-Trade Area and Instituting the Latin American Free
Trade Association, done, Feb. 18, 1960, reprintedin U.N. Economic Commission For Latin
America, I MULTILATERAL ECONOMIC COOPERATION IN LATIN AMERICA, 57 U.N. Doe.
E/CN.12/625 (1962). The member nations were: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Columbia, Ecuador, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, and Uruguay.
12. Note, PoliticalComponents and PracticalEffects of the Andean Foreign Investment
Code, 27 STAN. L. REV. 1597, 1598-99 (1975).
13. ANDEWAN GROUP: The Question of ForeignInvestment Triggers a Crisis, 20 CoMERCO EXTERIOR DE MEXICO 15,20 (Nov. 1974) (English ed.) [hereinafter cited as Question
of Foreign Investment].
14. Id
15. Id (emphasis added).
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tion of a subregional market comparable in size to Mexico's they could
attract foreign investment and begin a nationally controlled development of their industrial sectors.
Legally ANCOM merely formed a "subregion"' 6 within LAFTA
with the purpose not of weakening LAFTA but of strengthening it.
The Andean countries perceived that in order for LAFTA to function
fruitfully they must first develop a sufficient industrial base so that
opening their markets up to competition from the Big Three would not
jeopardize their development blueprints, which stressed the national
development of industries to meet national priorities and the reduction
of the adverse effects of foreign investments.
ANCOM's most salient features have been trade liberalization, a
common external tariff, industrial development programs and the
much debated foreign investment restrictions of D24.17
III. DECISION 24: ANCOM'S FOREIGN
INVESTMENT CODE
A. Roots of D24
Latin American states have traditionally scrambled after any
available foreign investment and seldom considered the consequences. 8 In the 1960's, however, interest focused on the adverse
political and economic impacts of an unregulated inflow of foreign investment. Concern arose over relations of "dependence." Dependency
theory hypothesized that underdevelopment is perpetuated
by socio-political and economic domination by a developed focal
state to which the lesser developed states are peripheral. The state of

dependency benefits a favored local class with close ties to the focal
state. This class attains power and retards a more
"healthy" eco9
nomic development to protract the relationship.'

The Andean group adopted a strategy based on "developmental
nationalism" which exhorted national development of basic industries
and the assertion of sovereignty over that development as the chief
weapons for eliminating relations of dependence.2"
16. A "subregion" is a smaller regional grouping of nations within a larger regional
grouping which also encompasses those nations.
17. See Cartagena Agreement, supra note 4.
18. Schill, supra note 2, at 437.
19. Horton, Peru and.4NCOM. A Study in the Disintegrationof a Common Mlarket, 17
TEx. INT'L

LI.. 39, 42 (1982).

20. Milenky, From Integrationto Developmental Nationalisn" The.4ndean Group, 19651971,25 INTER-AM. ECON. AFF. 77 (1971). Mr. Milenky defines "Developmental National-
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More than any other feature of ANCOM the Foreign Investment
Code manifested the rejection of "dependency" and the implementa-

tion of "developmental nationalism." The Code recognized the important role foreign investment plays in national development, but allowed
investment into the region only if it furthered integration objectives
and enhanced national priorities. 2 ' D24 "institut[ed] a framework in
ism" as "the use of industrialization as an economic strategy and political rallying point for
the rejection of all forms of external dependence by a developing country on the advanced
countries." Id at 78.
21. D24, supra note 5, at 138. See Question of ForeignInvestment, supra note 13, for a
list of the conclusions of the Cartagena Agreement Board on foreign investment. A list of
their conclusions is set forth below:
-The high cost of foreign investment in relation to other sources of financing.
-Its harmful influence on the constitution and reinforcement of domestic enterprises and on the attitude of local entrepreneurs; the relative reduction in the real
capacity of governments to make autonomous economic policy decisions, given
the possibility of conflict between the national interest and the interest of transnational corporations whose decision-making centers are foreign-based.
-The undesirability of foreign investment in certain cases because of the modalities it offers, the sector in which it is placed, or the conditions it proposes.
-The employment of a significant part of foreign investment in the purchase of
domestic business enterprises that have already reached acceptable levels of productivity and efficiency.
-The channeling of external resources into sectors properly covered by enterprises
of the recipient country through the establishment of foreign companies that because of their technological and financial power tend to eliminate local competitors from the market.
-Problems created in the re-export of invested capital and in the remittance of
profits producing a negative impact on the balance of payments.
-The harmful effects of indiscriminate reinvestment of profits at variance with the
economic policy objectives of the recipient country.
-Possible reduction of the funds available to official agencies in international
credit organizations because of endorsements or guarantees extended by governments to back foreign company credit operations.
-The small real contribution made by foreign investment to the respective company's fixed capital, especially when said company is the subsidiary of a transnational corporation. In such cases, capital is supplemented by recourse to local
credit, which produces equally undesirable consequences.
-The foreign company contribution to capital formation in the recipient country
is reduced to a minimum; there is the danger that wealth derived from domestic
resources be transferred abroad.
-The high cost of the transfer of foreign technology.
-Implicit, concealed payments through the overpricing of industrial equipment,
raw materials and intermediate goods provided by technology suppliers.
-The acquisition of foreign technology by the recipient enterprise is tied to the
obligation to purchase certain capital goods and raw materials from the supplier
company, which reserves the rights to fix the export price of the finished product,
-The payment of royalties of subsidiaries to the parent company for the acquisition of technology, patents and other unpatented expertise as part of their capital
stock.
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which regional goals determine the acceptability and function of...
foreign capital."'
"Decision 24's point of departure is the demythologization of the infinite bounties of foreign investment. It anticipates
and establishes its harmful effects, while accepting that it can for a time
23
and under certain conditions be useful."
B.

D24's Statutory Scheme

A principle of equity is postulated by D24 in the relations between
ANCOM's member states and foreign investors.2 4 Investors must receive a reasonable return on their investments and find new investment
opportunities opening up as the integration process proceeds. At the
same time, however, the nations expect that investments will respond to
a development strategy which orients capital toward priority sectors
and stresses participation of local capital in the ownership and management of the companies established with foreign capital. 5
The Code placed several limitations on foreign investment, the
most important of which: (1) excluded investment from important sectors such as utilities and communications; (2) required a "fade-out" of
foreign equity and control in business enterprises; (3) instituted foreign
investment registration requirements; (4) controlled profit remittance
and repatriation of capital; (5) limited foreign and local borrowing; and
(6) restricted terms for technology transfers.26 D24 set only minimum
standards for treatment of foreign investment and each nation could
impose harsher restrictions. Moreover, each country adopting D24
must use national political mechanisms for its implementation.
The Code has been frequently criticized. Excessive hostility to foreign investment and providing little or no incentive for investors to risk
their capital in such a hostile environment are cited as two of the major
drawbacks of the code.27
The fade-out requirement is perhaps the most controversial provision of D24.28 Any foreign owned new or existing company located in
Id at 19-20.
22. Note, Chile'r Rejection ofthe Andean Common M4arket Regulation ofForeignInvestment, 16 COLuM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 138, 143 (1977).
23. Question ofForeign Investment, supra note 13, at 19.
24. ANDEAN GROUP" Presidents' Meeting Gives New Integration Guidelines, 25 CoMERCIO EXTERIOR DE MExico 293, 299 (1979) (English ed.) [hereinafter cited as Presidents"
Meeting].
25. Id
26. See infra text accompanying notes 28-42.
27. Murphy, supra note 6.
28. D24, supra, note 5, art. 28.
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an Andean nation which wants to avail itself of ANCOM's trade advantages, such as favorable access to the ANCOM market for its products and enjoyment of the duty-free program, must divest a percentage
of its interest within fifteen years after its establishment and become a
"national" or "mixed" company.29 "National" enterprises are those in
which over 80% of capital and a corresponding amount of control reside in national investors.30 "Mixed" companies require that between
51% and 80% of equity and proportional control reside in national investors. 3 ' "Foreign enterprises" with less than 51% national investor
control and equity cannot participate in ANCOM's trade liberalization
program. An exception to the fade-out requirement arises if a company conducts over 80% of its business outside the Andean region 32 or,
in the case of a "mixed" company with less than 51% national participation, if the company allows the state "determining capacity in the
decisions of the enterprise. ' 33 The fade-out provision ensures eventual
national ownership of companies started with foreign capital. Some
foreign companies now negotiate joint ventures with nationals before
investing thus avoiding the later challenge of finding a suitable buyer.
Restrictions on remittance and reinvestment of profits and repatriation of capital also proved contentious. The Code originally restricted
the remittance of profits to 14%, but subsequently, as a result of the
Chilean crisis, a worldwide recession, and high interest rates, ANCOM
raised the remittance ceiling to 20% and provided members with an
option to raise it.34 The 1976 amendment also raised from 5% to 7%the
limit on reinvestment of profits back into the region without the prior
approval of the competent national authority. 35 Furthermore, upon divestment or liquidation companies may now repatriate all the capital
originally invested. This provision applies, however, only to sales to
national investors unless foreign investment is required to prevent the
imminent bankruptcy of the company.36
Article 2 requires that all foreign investors wishing to invest in a
member state submit an application to the competent national authority. After reviewing the application the authority must determine that
the investment corresponds with national development priorities before
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

Id
Id
Id
Id
Id
Id
Id
Id

art. 1.
art.
art.
art.
art.
art.

34.
36.
37.
13.
3.
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granting approval. This procedure slows the investment process but
provides assurances that investments will fit the state's needs.
The Code restricts the access of foreign investors to foreign and
local credit.3 7 Prior to the 1976 amendments foreign firms could receive only short-term local loans. The 1976 amendments, however,
made available medium-term local loans not exceeding three years.
Long-term local loans are still prohibited.38 There are also restrictions
on foreign based loans between interrelated companies. The Code limits the real rate of interest to no more than 3% above the prevailing rate
39
of first class securities within the country originating the loan.
Certain sectors of the economy are inaccessible to foreign investment because of the nations' desire to keep these sectors under national
control.4 Closed sectors include: basic products sectors such as mining; public service sectors such as telephones; financial institutions such
as banks; and other areas such as transportation and communication.
An important exception arises if a nation determines "special circum4
stances" exist which warrant lifting the ban on foreign investments. '
For example, Chile could have waived D24's ban on foreign investment in its extractive mining sectors if it believed this was required to
develop the mining industries which represent one of Chile's major
economic strengths.
Finally, the Code imposes tight control on the transfer of technology.42 Contracts dealing with transfers of technology must be administratively reviewed for their "effective contribution" to ANCOM. The
competent national authority must then approve the transfer after eliminating contract clauses involving matters such as price fixing. Preventing foreign corporations from using royalties and similar payments as
tools to extract excessive profits, and thus clandestinely circumventing
the remittance limitations, underlies this restriction.
It is important to realize that D24's restrictions were intended not
to discourage foreign investment but to control its direction. Although
the members recognized that investment might slow down, they felt
that by opening up a market comparable in size to Mexico's they could
attract foreign investment geared to their own development needs. In
fact, investment has continued to flow into the region at a rate higher
37. Id art. 17.
38. Id

39. Id art. 16.
40. Id arts. 40-44.
41. Id art. 44.

42. Id arts. 20, 25.
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than critics of D24 expected.4 3
IV.

EVENTS LEADING TO CHILE'S WITHDRAWAL

Chile faced severe economic instability following the 1973 overthrow of the Allende government. The new regime (hereinafter the
Junta) emphasized curtailing runaway inflation and accelerating economic growth by instituting a "traditional laissez-faire model of capitalist development." 44 Chile attempted to bolster sagging investor
confidence engendered by an economic depression and to encourage
rapid development utilizing foreign investment.
These attempts
culminated in the adoption of Decree Law 600, the Foreign Investment
Statute (hereinafter DL600 or the Statute).4 5 The Statute directly contravened key provisions of D24.16 Consequently, the consensus necessary for D24's effective operation started crumbling.
DL600's promulgation brought protests from Chile's ANCOM
47
partners upset over its generous treatment of foreign investment.
They believed Chile wanted to attract investment to Chile at the expense of the other ANCOM members.4 8 Such a ploy could escalate
national statutory attempts at liberalizing D24 and could result in full
scale competition for foreign investment by the ANCOM members-a
possibility ANCOM supposedly swept away with D24. DL600 also
raised the fear that the Chilean economy would "become an instrument
of foreign capital penetration by opening a breach through which [for49
eign capital] could attempt to obtain control of subregional markets."
DL600 contradicted the philosophical thrust of D24 by allowing
foreign capital almost unrestricted entry into the region. This ease of
entry could prevent the growth of independent and viable national enterprises by not assuring that incoming capital meets national needs
and eventually yields to national control.5
Chile counterattacked by arguing that DL600 did not really violate D24 and attributed DL600's contrast with D24 to differences in
43. See In Spite of Crisis and Recession: Foreing [sic] Investment in the Andean Group
Increasedin Just Six Months, 2 ANDEAN GROUP 1 (1983) [hereinafler cited as Investnent in
the Andean Group]; see also Presidents'Meeting, note 24, at 299.
44. Note, supra note 22, at 138, 151.
45. DL600, supra note 7.
46. See infra text accompanying notes 96-114.
47. Briones, The Andean Pact CrisisandDevelopment Options in Latin America, 22 CoMERCIO EXTERIOR DE MExico 259, 262 (1976) (English ed.).
48. Vargas-Hidalgo, supra note 6, at 405.
49. Briones, supra note 47, at 260.
50. Note, supra note 22, at 156.
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interpretation.5 ' Chile also asserted that it found D24 no longer "practicable" because D24 conflicted with Chile's development model and
deterred foreign investment required to implement that model.52

Chile's official position vis-a-vis the nexus between its development model and foreign investment was expounded by Economy Minister Sergio de Castro.13 He stated that Chile needed at least a 7%
annual growth rate since lower rates could not solve Chile's income

distribution problem. 4 To attain the goal of 7% expansion the investment level had to be very high, and, according to Minister Castro, foreign investment was the best means to achieve Chile's goal.5 5 Chile

was acting under the assumption that a high growth rate fueled by an
influx of foreign capital alone would revitalize its economy and lead to

development. In return for this perceived benefit Chile was willing to
overturn the regulatory framework of D24.

Although DL600 article 1956 apparently recognized the need to
abide by Andean Commission decisions, including D24, this clause was

"patently no more than cosmetic.

'57

Chile indicated it found three pro-

visions of D24 particularly repugnant. The 14% remittance ceiling~s
was viewed as no longer realistic and even prohibitive given worldwide high interest rates.5 9 The Junta also found the fade-out provisions
objectionable as a strain on scarce native capital.6 Chile viewed possible state intervention aimed at the buying-out of foreign interests and
the incumbent nationalization of the enterprise as repulsive to its free

enterprise economic system. Instead, Chile proposed a selective appli51. Question ofForeignInvestment, supra note 13, at 17.
52. BUSINESS INTERNATIONAL CORP., CHILE AFTER ALLENDE 66-67 (1975).
53. 4NDEAN GROUP: 4 Split SeemnsInevitable, 22 COMERCIO EXTERIOR DE MEXICO
402 (1976) (English ed.) [hereinafter cited as4 Split Seems Inevitable].
54. Id
55. Id Mr. Castro stated that
the solution is to be found in borrowings or in attracting foreign investment ....
sufficiently large foreign credit possibilities are not too great, at least in the case of
Chile. Our foreign debt is already fairly large. Consequently, the only door open
to us is foreign investment, which provides not only capital but management skills,
technology and access to new markets. We believe that even if our indebtedness
potential were greater, we would still do better by attracting foreign investment.
Id
56. DL600, supra note 7, art. 19 states that "the enterprises comprising foreign investment must comply with the. . . decisions arising out of [the Cartagena Agreement] that are
validly compulsory in Chile."
57. Horton, supra note 19, at 46.
58. See supra notes 34-36 and accompanying text.
59. BUSINESS INTERNATIONAL CORP., supra note 52, at 67.
60. Note, supra note 22, at 160.
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cation of the divestment provision which would exclude foreign owned

companies producing solely for the local market or for export to nonANCOM countries. 6 ' The other members rapidly rejected this propo-

sal for two reasons. First, it "emasculated the common market concept
at the heart of ANCOM."62 Second, on a practical level it provided no
guarantee that intermediate or final products meant for Chile would
not end up in ANCOM markets and thus allow foreign investors to get

around D24's restrictions.6" Chile also lobbied for a change in D24's
provision which prohibited direct foreign investment into Chile to acquire the stock, shares or ownership rights of national investors unless
necessary to prevent bankruptcy.

4

This clause interfered with Chile's

efforts aimed at de-nationalizing industries nationalized since the
1930s.65 The other members, as a concession to Chile,66 granted Chile
an exception enabling it to proceed with that program.6 7 Those companies sold to foreign investors, however, were not able to participate in
the tariff liberalization program unless they agreed to transform into

national or joint enterprises in conformance with D24.
Chile, fearing isolation from ANCOM and LAFTA, felt pressured

into remaining within ANCOM. As a sign of good faith it enacted
Decree Law 746 which recognized D24 as part of the Chilean legal

structure and named a local administrative authority to approve incoming investment. 8
61. Id at 163.
62. Id
63. Id
64. Vargus-Hidalgo, supra note 6, at 406.
65. Id at 407.
66. ANDE,4N GROUP.- TransactionAgreement, 22 COMERCio EXTERIOR Dr MEXICO
226, 227 (1976) (English ed.).
67. Id Decision 97 permitted Chile to sell shares of firms belonging to the state to
foreign investors. Id
68. Horton,supra note 19, at 46. See ANDEAN GROUP. Unity in the SubregionalPact
in Re-established, 22 COMERCMO EXTERIOR DE MEXICO 49 (1976) (English ed.) [hereinafter
cited as Unity Re-established] in which the Cartagena Agreement Commission unanimously
approved this statement:
A. After hearing reports on the measures adopted, and to be adopted, by the
Chilean Government, as set forth by the board Coordinator and the Chilean
Ambassador, the Commission recognizes that Decree Law 746, issued by the
Chilean Government on November 6, 1974, shows that Decision No. 24 is
being fully enforced in that country and forms part of Chilean law, for which
the Commission expresses its satisfaction.
B. The Commission further understands that Decision No. 24, because of its
quality as international commitment, takes precedence in all member countries over internal provisions regarding foreign investment and on trademarks,
patents, licences and royalties and, in consequence, prevails over them.
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ANCOM'S ATTEMPTS TO KEEP CHILE FROM
DEFECTING

The major ANCOM crisis to date occurred in 1976. In that year
Chile's verbal assaults on ANCOM increased and it became clear that
the Junta sought two additional major concessions: "a low common
outer tariff and the virtual elimination of ANCOM's Foreign Investment Code."6 9 Chile's attack on the Code stressed the incompatibility
of D24 with the Junta's formula for economic recovery. 70 Furthermore, Chile stifled ANCOM's further integration efforts by delaying
ratification of a proposed tariff reduction schedule 7 I and by using its
withheld approval as leverage to extract concessions.
The other ANCOM nations found some merit with Chile's claims
that the remittance ceiling at 14% remained too low and that some
modification in the fade-out requirements might be advisable given the
world economic recession. 72 Under pressure from Chile and from economic circumstances such as the world wide recession which caused
investors to invest where they could get higher returns, the other members of ANCOM proved amenable to some compromise changes in
D24. These changes included: (1) allowing fade-out through increases
of capitalization in addition to sales of existing stock; (2) setting a uniform date for beginning fade-out; (3) raising the automatic reinvestment of profits limit from 5% to 7%; (4) granting foreign firms access to
medium-term loans up to three years; (5) permitting acquisition by foreign investors of local enterprises through increased capitalization as
long as the local enterprise retained at least 51% local ownership;
(6) treating capital flowing from one country to another as national investment; (7) treating investments of public international financial entities or of foreign governmental entities of economic cooperation as
neutral and not subject to D24's strictures; and, most importantly,
(8) increasing the remittance ceiling from 14% to 20% with member
nations having the option to raise it if their competent national authorities found it necessary.73 This meant the increased remittance ceiling
69. ChileandAnconr What are the Issues and What Can Result, 1976 Bus. LATIN AM.
297 [hereinafter cited as What are the Issues].
70. Id
71. Id at 297, 298.
72. Id at 298.
73. ANCOM Modcation of Decision 24 Turns out Quite Extensive, 1976 Bus. LATIN
AM. 292, 293; Decision No. 103 of the Commission of the Cartagena Agreement, Nov. 30,
1976, reprintedin 16 I.L.M. 138 (1977) (the ANCOM Commission adopted Decision 103 and
incorporated it into D24). See supra note 148 and accompanying text.
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These alterations demonstrated

ANCOM's willingness both to compromise with a disgruntled member
and to perceive and act on world economic trends that necessitated
substantive changes to keep the Code viable.
Even with these changes the Code remained too restrictive to meet
Chile's demands. Consequently, Chile failed to ratify the changes

within the deadline set by ANCOM and withdrew from the Pact in
4
October 1976 under pressure from the other ANCOM nations.1

Chile based its withdrawal on the assumption that without the
Code foreign investment would flock to Chile. Two factors weighed
against this eventuality. First, Chile's extractive industries, which constituted its main attraction for foreign investors, were already exempted
from D24 under the "special circumstances" clause.7 5 Second, without

the enticement of favored entry for goods manufactured in Chile into
ANCOM's large market, investors would be wary of developing manufacturing industries designed to serve only Chile's smaller market. 6
Instead, new investment would most likely concentrate on export and
extractive industries and allow industries tailored for national 77 or re-

gional markets to languish. Therefore, manufacturing enterprises that
could have serviced a regional or national market would go undevel-

oped and Chile would be left to develop those economic sectors best
able to compete in a world market. That Chile withdrew in spite of
these considerations revealed the Junta's unwillingness to abide by any

regulations which appeared inconsistent with its liberal economic structure and which it perceived might deter foreign investment and slow
down economic recovery.
74. Ancom Appears Undauntedby Chilean WithdrawalFrom the Pact, 1976 Bus, LATIN
AM. 353 [hereinafter cited asAncom Appears Undaunted]. Chile still followed four ANCOM
decisions not significant for the major aims of the Pact: Decision 46, on multinationals;
Decision 40 on double taxation among the member countries; Decision 56, a heavy vehicle
highway transit; and Decision 94, on medium distance truck highway system, The repudiation of D24 was complete. Id
75. D24, supra note 5, art. 44.
76. What are the Issues, supra note 69, at 297. See Investing in Chile: CorporateSurvey
Reveals Pros and Cons, 1978 Bus. LATIN AM. 362, 366 [hereinafter cited as Investing in
Chile], which explains that Chile's modest market size detracts from its attractiveness to
manufacturers who often have policies against investing in a country with such a small
population.
77. Briones, supra note 47, at 261.
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VI.

THE ORIGINAL FOREIGN INVESTMENT
STATUTE: DL600

The Junta designed DL600 as an attractive and predictable statute
which would form the cornerstone of its efforts to attract foreign investment. The statute applied to investments flowing into Chile as of July
1974 and gave already existing foreign companies an option to be covered by its provisions. A single ministerial agency, the Foreign Investment Committee (hereinafter FIC), approved foreign investments
"with a view of streamlining, expediting and implementing a uniform
foreign investment policy.""8 The FIC used a fixed term contract for
formalizing authorization of investments.79 The contract set forth the
terms under which investment must operate and put a ten-year limit on
the operation period, although it allowed an extension for up to twenty
years when justified. 0
The Junta left such key details as limits on profit remittances, taxation rates, and foreign exchange rates for determination on a case-bycase basis during contract negotiations. Presumably the Junta left these
norms undefined to maximize its flexibility vis-a-vis foreign investors.
Silence on profit remittances could have been interpreted as a policy of
full remittance except insofar as this policy created balance of payment
problems by the export of too much scarce capital out of the country.8 '
Investors in Chile could also sell their profits from exports and take the
money from that sale out of the country; this provided a handy loophole to D24's remittance ceiling. 2
Article 5 provided that foreign enterprises would receive the same
treatment as national investors. This "non-discriminatory" clause covered subjects such as tax rates and assessments, tariff duties, foreign
exchange, imports and exports, and applications of liabilities. 3 Furthermore, a procedure existed whereby foreign investors could apply to
the FIC for removal of discriminatory regulations and, in the event this
application was rejected, the investor could receive compensation.'
Although this provision did not explicitly outlaw discrimination, it provided reassuring protection against unequal treatment.
The Statute made three major incentives available to investors
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

DL600 Preamble, quoted in Note, supra note 22, at 153.
DL600, supra note 7, art. 1.
Id art. 3.
Note, supra note 22, at 154.
Id
DL600, supra note 7, art. 5.
Id art. 6. See id art. 33.
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through contract negotiations on a case-by-case basis. First, a partial
or total exemption from customs duties on imported capital goods was
granted to companies in which foreign investors held at least 20% ownership. 85 Second, foreign investors received a lower rate on additional
taxes if a double taxation treaty 86 did not exist between Chile and the
investor's base country. 7 Third, if a foreign investor's participation in
an existing enterprise was deemed of great national importance, an exception would be made to the ban restricting acquisition of more than
20% of an existing privately owned company. 8 This last measure implemented Chile's plan of selling back nationalized industries, such as
mining companies.
The Statute set no express limit on a foreign investor's access to
internal credit.89 Instead it allowed the FIC power to authorize local
loans to foreign investors and it contained no express limits on the
loan's payback period. 90 Foreign loan guarantees were allowed proportionally to the amount of equity controlled by national investors,
but if both the state and a foreign interest jointly participated, the entire loan could be guaranteed. 9'
VII.

DL600'S RELATIONSHIP TO D24

DL600 did not clarify Chile's position vis-a-vis D24. Article 3 of
DL600 ambiguously stated that the contracts Chile concluded with foreign investors would be in accordance with "international obligations"
legally binding in Chile.9 2 With little extra clarity, article 19 of DL600
blithely mentioned the Cartagena Agreement and confirmed that Chile
must follow the decisions derived from that Agreement. Rather than
requiring adherence to the substance of D24, articles 3 and 19 "[C]ould
be construed as simply recognizing the procedural processes by which
...decisions entered into force. . . upon the promulgation of imple85. Id art. 17.
86. A double taxation treaty between two nations is designed to prevent double taxation. Generally, such treaties provide that a national from one contracting state who receives specific types of income will be taxed at a lower rate in the contracting state in which
the income is derived. See, e.g., P. Postlewaite & M. Collins, INTERNATIONAL INDIVIDUAL
TAXATION 215-17 (1982).

87. DL600, supra note 7, art. 15.
88. Id art. 4.
89. Id art. 24.
90. Id
91. Id art. 25.
92. Id art. 3 which states "The contracts. . . shall include, .. other rules that may be
of pertinent application to said investment pursuant to . . .the international obligations,
observance of which is validly binding in Chile."
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menting national legislation. 93 Additionally, Chile argued that the
Cartagena Agreement did not bind states but companies which would
presumably submit to D24's controls. 4 In any case, apparently some
ANCOM members believed the two articles implied D24's application
in Chile was uncertain especially in light of Chile's continuous protestations that DL600 did not conflict with D24. 91
The substantive areas in which DL600 seemingly repudiated D24
confirmed the belief that Chile was reluctant to enforce D24.
[DL600 contained] a long list of concessions to foreign capital...
beginning with the definition of foreign, investment, which was
stretched to encompass even investments made by Chileans with
more than three years residence abroad, or those represented as technology contributions. The first definition contravened Article 1 of
Decision 24 and the second Article 2. Further, in violation of the
spirit of D24, it gave foreign capital broad facilities for investing in
practically all economic areas.
Article 17 frees capital goods from import duties when destined for
the development of projects in which theforeign capitalshare is over

20 percent, that is, it discriminates against domestic enterprise, or
rather, it encouragesforeigncapitalto take majority control9of
the com6
panies in which itparticipates. [emphasis in the original.]

DL600 made no mention of a fade-out requirement, but did provide an extension period of up to twenty years as a way of avoiding the
unmentioned divestment provision of D24. 97 This lengthy extension
took the punch out of D24's divestment plans and affirmed Chile's
commitment to long-term stable investment relationships. Furthermore, D24's profit remittance limitations were excluded from DL600.
By allowing direct sale of exchange proceeds the Statute supplied a
ready-made mechanism for dodging remittance ceilings. 98 Contract
negotiations provided the only vehicle through which Chile could impose profit remittance limitations, and its main motive for doing so was
the protection of balance of payments rather than assuring that investors remit only "reasonable" profits, a principle manifested in D24.99
The credit provisions conflicting with D24 also caused contro93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

Note, supra note 22, at 158.
Briones, supra note 47, at 261.
Id See also Question of Foreign Investment, supra note 13, at 16.
Briones, supra note 47, at 261.
DL600, supra note 7, art. 3.
Id art. 12.
See supra notes 34-36 and accompanying text.
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versy. 'I Chile's flexible treatment of foreign credit contravened D24's
0t
virtual ban on foreign loan guarantees without state participation.1
DL600 did not explicitly limit internal loans to foreign investors, but
gave the FIC wide discretion, 02 whereas D24 limited access to medium
and long-term credit." 3 Chile's position on loans reflected a willingness to financially support an enterprise capable of making effective
economic contributions regardless of its foreign or national character.
The tempered D24 approach on the other hand, reserved most local
credit for national enterprises which maximized national development
priorities.'"
Another major divergence involved the legal treatment accorded
foreign investors. DL600 incorporated a clause mandating non-discrimination against foreign investors."°0 Guarantees of compensation
and administrative review gave substance to the non-discrimination
clause. 0 6 By contrast D24 merely accorded foreign investors no more
favorable treatment than national investors. 0 7 While D24 provided no
comforting protection against less favorable treatment it also did not
exclude equal treatment. DL600, however, implied a more favorable
treatment for foreign investors in Chile's courts than that given national investors, 08 which ran directly counter to D24's exclusion of forums favorable to foreign investors. 10 9 Thus, a foreign investor could
enjoy favorable treatment in Chile's courts in the event a controversy
arose.
As expected, the differences between D24 and DL600 fueled a vigorous debate within ANCOM." ° If the statute were allowed to stand
unchallenged, foreign investment might deviate toward Chile with its
favorable treatment, and injure the other member nations."'t Following Chile's adoption of Decree Law 746 reaffirming D24's prominence
in Chile's legal order, the other ANCOM members moved toward con100. Note, supra note 22, at 161.
101. DL600, supra note 7, art. 25. See D24, supra note 5, art. 5.
102. DL600, supra note 7, art. 24.
103. D24, supra note 5, art. 17.
104. Note, supra note 22, at 162.
105. DL600, supra note 7, art. 5.
106. Id
107. D24, supra note 5, art. 50.
108. DL600, supra note 7, art. 33.
109. D24, supra note 5, art. 51. See also Note, supra note 22, at 162-63. Article 51 was
reminiscent of the Calvo Doctrine which sought to limit the rights of aliens to those rights
given by domestic law to nationals in domestic forums. Id. at 163.
110. Briones, supra note 47, at 261.
111. Id at 262.
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ciliation with Chile. 112 Chile, however, could still apply DL600 without contradicting D24 under the "special circumstances" exception
covering fundamental economic sectors.'" 3 Chile took advantage of
this exception and applied DL600 to govern investment in those sectors, most notably the extractive industries." 4
Chile tolerated relatively unrestricted foreign investment penetrating the most vital areas of its economy in exchange for the perceived
benefits accruing from rapid development. In allowing this condition it
permitted investors greater economic influence and thereby diminished
national control over development. Additionally, Chile had clearly signaled its decision to deviate from D24's restrictions and to no longer
adhere to D24's philosophy. Chile's withdrawal from ANCOM was
almost inevitable after its enactment of DL600.
VIII.

CHILE'S 1977 AMENDMENT TO DL600

In 1977, about a year after its withdrawal from ANCOM, Chile
passed Decree Law 1748 (DL1748)." 5 DL1748 amended DL600 and
further liberalized its approach toward incoming foreign investment.
This amendment irrevocably repudiated the ANCOM strategy of developmental nationalism.
Chile clearly hoped the new statute would attract a massive influx
of foreign investment. Investment did increase between 1977 and 1978,
but as the economy started a downward swing in 1979, investors hesitated and investment fell 30%.' 16 Analysts predicted "sluggish" foreign
investment opportunities in Chile for 1982 with businesses cutting back
on investments." 7 Concern over Chile's economic trends and a spiral
toward recession underlie decreased foreign confidence in Chile's investment climate."" Initially after the amendment was passed, however, transnational companies responded with alacrity to Chile's
rejection of D24 and to DL600's favorable treatment of foreign invest112. Unity Re-established,supra note 68, at 49; see also Vargas-Hidalgo, supra note 6. at
405-06 for the impact of Decree Law No. 746 in Chile. Even after its adoption Chile continued lobbying the Andean Commission for changes in D24. Id See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
113. D24, supra note 5, art. 44.
114. Note, supra note 22, at 166.

115. DL1748, supra note 8.
116. Developing Trends in Chile's Econony Spark Concern, 1981 Bus. LArTN Am. 173

[hereinafter cited as Developing Trends].
117. Business Outlook, 1982 Bus. LATIN AM. 164. More current data were not available
when this note went into publication.
118. Id See also Developing Trends, supra note 116, at 173.

Hastings Int'l and Comparative Law Review

[Vol. 7

ment even though the alluring prospect of tapping the Andean market
had vanished.' ,9
The amendment of DL600 begins with a statement that experience
applying DL600 "revealed areas susceptible of improvement." 1 0 Thus
article 1 replaced the 1974 version of DL600 with the 1977 amendment,
but maintained the decree-number DL600.12 ' The amendment instituted several substantive changes aimed at encouraging new investment, stabilizing investor relationships with Chile, and cutting through
red tape.
Significant incentives were dangled before investors to entice positive responses. For example, no substantive prohibitions on profit remittance or capital repatriation were applied. The new statute,
however, mandated a three-year holding period for original capital
before it could be repatriated' 22 and limited acquisition of the foreign
exchange required for repatriation to only the proceeds of a sale to a
new investor or liquidation. 2 3 Neither provision imposed a very severe restriction. Foreign exchange for remittance and repatriation became available on the same terms as that applicable to Chilean
124
nationals purchasing foreign exchange to cover general imports.
This meant investors could remit all their profits subject only to provisions in their contracts which might limit remittance. Moreover, the
Statute offered foreign exchange at the most favorable prevailing
rate.' 5 Faced with a devalued peso and resultant inflation, 126 Chile
may find it necessary to reevaluate its remittance policy in order to
ensure sufficient supplies of foreign exchange for other purposes such
as paying interest on foreign loans.
The Statute includes no time limit restricting the period a foreign
investment may remain in Chile. 127 The only limitation is the threeyear holding period required for capital repatriation. Absence of such
a provision marks a change from the former DL600 which limited investments to ten years but also granted extensions for up to twenty
119. Chile's Welcome Matfor Foreign Investment Begins to Pay Off, 1976 Bus. LATIN
AM. 167. See Developing Trends, supra note 116, at 173. See also Foreign Investnett in
Chile, 1978 Bus. LATIN AM. 243.
120. DL1748, supra note 8, Declaration 3.
121. Id art. 1.
122. Id art. 4.
123. Id art. 5.
124. Id art. 4.
125. Id
126. Devaluation in Chile Means Change in Model and Troublesfor Business, 1982 Bus.
LATIN AM. 185, 186.
127. DL1748, supra note 8, art. 4.
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years as a means of circumventing D24's regulations. 28 Furthermore,
no provision mandates partial sale of investments to Chilean nationals,
fade-out, or divestment. In principle therefore, foreign investors may
enjoy total control over their investments during the entire period of
their stay in Chile. Clearly, this signals a total rejection of D24's
framework for establishing national control over development and the
inputs into development such as foreign investment.
An anti-discrimination clause, which grants foreign investors the
same rights and obligations as Chilean nationals, cannot be waived by
contract or otherwise. 129 One exception exists in article 11 which allows the government authority to limit foreign investors' access to local
credit when justified. If an issued regulation appears discriminatory
against foreign investors article 10 provides a petition process whereby
the FIC may remove the discrimination. If, however, the investor receives no satisfaction through that process he or she may initiate regular court proceedings to "obtain a ruling as to whether or not
' 30
discrimination exists and, if so, that the general rule of law applies."'
This means once discrimination as defined in article 9 is found, the law
mandates its abolition. No provision duplicates former DL600's mechanism offering compensation rather than removal of discriminatory
regulations.' 3 ' The Statute merely solidifies what DL600 intended but
only implied.
The establishment of a guaranteed unchangeable tax regime applicable to foreign investors constitutes one of the Statute's most innova32
tive and attractive features from a foreign investor's viewpoint.
Holders of foreign investments may include in their contracts with the
FIC a clause guaranteeing a tax no higher than 49.5%.' 33 The clause
extends ten years from the day the contract is signed.13 This permits a
ten-year stability period free from the vicissitudes associated with domestic tax rates. An investor may waive this option "and become subject to the regular tax regime and any changes in the general taxation
128. See supra text accompanying note 80.
129. DL1748, supra note 8, art. 9 defines a discriminatory law or regulation as one relating to productive activities and applicable to most productive activity but excluding foreign
investment from coverage, or one which creates special regimes for selected economic sectors and denies foreign investment access to those sectors even though it meets the legal
requirements.
130. Id art. 10.
131. See supra text accompanying note 106.
132. DL1748, supra note 8, art. 7.
133. Id
134. I
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scheme . . . consequently, forfeiting assessment at the agreed fixed

rate."' 5 Foreign investors can negotiate, during the contract phase, a
guarantee against fluctuations in sales and services tax, in the importation of capital equipment and machinery not locally produced, and in
tariffs.' 3 6 This tax guarantee generally applies to the period required
for establishing the
investment, but can be extended by the FIC for up
137
to twelve years.
The attempt by Chile to slice through burdensome red tape affecting foreign investment manifests itself in the approval mechanisms the
Statute established. 38 Article 12 grants the FIC exclusive power to authorize entry of foreign capital. Investments requiring FIC approval
are: (1) foreign investments exceeding U.S. $5 million; (2) investments
intruding into public services, or sectors or activities normally reserved
for the state; (3) investments into media or communications; and (4) investments by a foreign state or foreign public institution. 39 Most foreign investments of less than U.S. $5 million require authorization only
by the Executive Secretary of the FIC after gaining the Minister of the
Economy's (FIC President) prior consent.' 40 The FIC is effectively excluded from evaluating investments less than U.S. $5 million. Thus,
those smaller investments enjoy an almost "rubber stamp" entry into
Chile.
The Statute provides that foreign enterprises with investments
made under DL600 have the option of going under the amendment. 4 '
All new investment comes under DL 1748, the amendment to DL600. 42
The amendment places a larger welcome mat before foreign investors than did the original DL600. Its promulgators reacted to weaknesses the Junta perceived in both D24 43 and DL600, and to Chile's
model of development which stresses foreign investments' positive role
in serving the economy. The Statute's emphasis on stability and ease of
entry demonstrate the rejection of ANCOM's ambivalence regarding
the role of foreign investment in national economies.44 By eliminating
135. Id
136. Id art. 8.
137. Chile's FavorableForeign Investment Law, 1977 Bus. LATIN AM. 103.
138. DL1748, supra note 8, arts. 12-17.
139. Id art. 16.
140. Id art. 17.
141. Id art. 1 (Transitory Provisions).
142. Id art. 1.
143. See supra text accompanying notes 58-60.
144. See supra text accompanying notes 127, 132, 138. This ambivalence is best illustrated by the ANCOM members' desire to attract foreign investment while also wishing to
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fade-out requirements and limitations on remittance, however, Chile
cut the heart out of a nationalist developmental strategy and took steps
toward reestablishing relations of dependence. Although in the short
term investment stimulated by these easy access terms may gravitate
toward Chile and rouse its economic fortunes, the Statute offers no solution to the relations of dependence which originally inspired D24 and
actually expands Chile's dependence on its investor benefactors. In the
long run Chile may lose control over the direction development takes
and increasingly open itself to the self-interested priorities of foreign
investors. Thus, national priorities will be subordinated to the priorities of outsiders. "It is evident that [Chile's development scheme] can
be developed only under conditions of a high degree of subordination
to foreign capital, carrying dependency and denationalization to their
extremes." 145
IX.

DECISION 24 SINCE CHILE'S WITHDRAWAL

A possible consequence of ANCOM's crisis over Chile was the
breakup of ANCOM. The five remaining members of ANCOM had
agreed to significant changes in D24 to keep Chile and in doing so had
compromised the original integration model without attaining their
goal.146 On a cosmetic level, therefore, Chile's defection scarred the
facade of unity within the pact. On a substantive level, however, the
defection produced some positive results. Without Chile, "Ancom will
be strengthened by being able to pursue its integration plan unhampered by a reluctant bedfellow."' 4 7 For example, the Pact approved the tariff reduction timetable as well as the proposed
modifications drafted in response to Chile's pressure.' 48 Moreover, the
integration process probably sustained little damage. 49 Chile's main
exports to the other member nations, newsprint and pulp, had already
faced elimination under the sectorial development program. 5 0 Chile
also participated in only a small percentage of ANCOM trade.' 5 ' Most
limit its impact on the sovereignty of the nation, even though by doing so they may discourage such investment.
145. Briones, supra note 47, at 260.
146. A Split Seems Inevitable, supra note 53, at 401.
147. ANCOM Begins Drafting ConditionsforChilean Iflthdrawal, 1976 Bus. LAi A.t
335.
148. Seesupra note 73 and accompanying text. Decision 100 adopted the tariff reduction
timetable. See Ancom Appears Undaunted,supra note 74, at 354.
149. Report, Latin American Economic Integration, 9 LAw Am.179, 180-81 (1977).
150. Id
151. Id
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importantly, ANCOM displayed a commitment to keeping intact its
strategy of developmental nationalism and reducing dependency as
manifested in D24, while also breathing new vitality into it. Rather
than disintegrating, ANCOM demonstrated resilience and consistency
by sticking to its goals of national control over development and introducing flexibility into the D24 restrictions.' 52
Within ANCOM there has been pressure for further review and
modification of D24 from groups such as the Venezuelan Chamber of
Commerce.153 This pressure is linked to the "fc]onsiderable investment
which will be required in the Andean Group countries in order to carry
out the industrial programs. According to The Andean Report, execution of the major industrial projects will require the investment of some
18 billion dollars over the next eight to ten years."' 5 4 The groups calling for review focus on the benefits of foreign investment; for instance,
the supplying of funds essential for a balance of payments and the importation of technology and business know-how. They essentially call
on the profits that investors may remit to their
for a review of the limits
55
countries of origin. 1

The assumption underlying the pressure for a review of D24 is that
D24 has acted as a brake on foreign investment and that a modification
will encourage foreign investors to introduce capital into the region.
This view does not hold up when compared to the objective facts. At
the third meeting of the Andean countries Planning Council a thorough analysis of the effect of D24 on foreign investment was undertaken.' 56 The analysis concluded that "there is no proof that the flow
of investments has diminished towards Andean countries as a result of
Decision 24."' The Council also concluded that "the Decision has
152. See generallyNew '4ndean MNC" Ruling, 1982 Bus. LATIN AM. 114, which expresses the view that due to D24's tough rules on Andean MNCs (Decision 169), this concept is doomed to a marginal role; see also Decision 169 Andean MultinationalEnterprise,
ANDEAN GROUP 2-3 (Sept. 1982).
153. President'rMeeting, supra note 24, at 298-99.
154. Id
155. Id
156. Andean Rulesfor Foreign CapialBring FavorableResults, 4 ANDEAN GROUP, at 4
(Jan. 1978) [hereinafter cited as FavorableResults].
157. Id During the 1967-71 period, the time immediately preceding D24's application,
the average annual rate of foreign investment coming to the Andean Group was -0.4%. During the 1971-77 period, however, with D24's regulatory framework in place, foreign investment increased at an annual average of 7.6%, while the manufacturing sector showed an
8.3% increase. Accumulated foreign investment in the Andean Group at the end of 1977
was $8 billion with $1.86 billion in the manufacturing sector. President rMeeting, supra note
24, at 299.
In the first semester of 1982, up to $574.8 million had flowed into the Andean Group
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contributed significantly to the orderly channeling of investments."1 58
The Council attributed ANCOM's success in attracting foreign investment, despite D24's restrictions, to the uniform and stable application of D24, which sets forth investor's rights and duties when investing
in an Andean nation.' 59 The common market mechanism, which ensures preferential access to a market larger than that of any individual
member country, was also cited as an inducement to foreign capital." °
D24's greatest problems have, however, resulted from an uneven
(for example, a selective application of D24's provisions) and sometimes inconsistent (for example, as different interpretations of a provision of D24) application of the Code by ANCOM members. This
inconsistency results form the conflicting economic policies that members pursue and from the different levels of development among the
members which causes protectionist responses.' 6' The Code somewhat
mitigates the uneven development factor by granting special treatment
to the most undeveloped members, Bolivia and Ecuador.' 62 Different
foreign exchange systems among the ANCOM nations which allow
greater or lesser opportunities for foreign investors also contribute to
the inconsistent application of D24.' 63 Furthermore, the temptation to
offer foreign investors attractive investment opportunities which might
spur rapid development creates dynamics compelling each member to
compete with others for investment. Such dynamics can destroy integration movements through snowballing unrestrained competition and
resultant distrust. So far ANCOM has prevented the worst examples.
Peru's statute implementing D24 demonstrates the tendency toward stretching the Code to its limit.'" Peru reversed its harsh policy
toward foreign investment and offered new regulations providing the
most favorable treatment possible under D24.' 65 Sagging industries, an
unpredictable investment climate, and a change of government prodespite an economic crisis and recession. Reports put together by the Junta ofthe Cartagena
Agreement made a provisional finding that up to the first half of 1982 the Andean countries
had accumulated more than $5,471 million of foreign investment. Investment in the Andean
Group, supra note 43, at 1.
158. FavorableResults, supra note 156, at 4.
159. Id
160. Id
161. Horton, supra note 19, at 61.
162. D24, supra note 5, art. 30, which allows a twenty-year period for Bolivia and Ecuador instead of the normal fifteen years.
163. Presidents'Meeting,supra note 24, at 298.
164. Ancom Rules Interpretation Signals Peru's Commitment to 4ttract Foreign In'estment, 1982 Bus. LATIN AM. 25 [hereinafter cited as Peru'r Commitment].
165. Id
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vided the impetus for this move. 166
Peru's treatment of the fade-out clause is especially interesting.
The rules require that "only established companies wishing to take ad167
vantage of Ancom's trade liberalization measures must fade out."'
Foreign investors, however, must still agree to divest 51% of their equity over a fifteen-year period.' 6 8 The profit remittance rules were also
altered to allow the national Commission authority to review requests
for remittances of profits above 20%.169 This 20% limit is optional
under D24.17 ° In deciding these requests the Commission must consider such factors as "employment generation; contribution to development of the country's outlying regions; increased production of goods
to satisfy national needs; promotion and diversification of exports; selective import substitution; [and] development of the Andean integration process."'1' Peru announced a new time schedule for considering
petitions placed by foreign investors. Maximum time periods for review were established with a view toward facilitating the investment

process. 172
Although Peru, unlike Chile after DL600, remains within D24's
regulatory bounds, the rules Peru adopted could strain relations with
other members. It appears, however, that though Peru desires greater
foreign investment, it remains committed to national development
principles which are consistent with the goals of D24.
Other members have adopted statutes somewhere between Venezuela's harsh treatment of foreign investment and Peru's liberal approach. 73 A "confusing and even chaotic" situation is the result of all
these different laws implementing D24.174 Long-term stability and assurances against expropriations and nationalizations are foremost concers among foreign investors. A uniform approach to foreign
investment is important to assure the continued flow of foreign investment into the region. The recently established Andean Court of Justice
may provide the vehicle through which ANCOM achieves its goals of
166. Id See generally Horton, supra note 19, at 61.
167. Peru' Commitment, supra note 164, at 25.
168. Id at 30.
169. Id
170. D24, supra note 5, art. 37.
171. Peru's Commitment, supra note 164, at 30.
172. Id
173. Investment Regulationsfor Nine Latin American Countries, 1982 Bus. LATIN AM.
260, 261.
174. Juncadella, The ForeignInvestment Laws of Latin America: Present and Future 16
INT'L LAW. 463, 464 (1982).
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uniformity and stability.17 5
X.

THE ANDEAN COURT OF JUSTICE

At an ANCOM meeting on May 28, 1979, the Presidents of the
five remaining member nations signed the Treaty creating the Court of
Justice of the Cartagena Agreement (hereinafter called the Court). 7 6
Before the Court's establishment only the individual members' legislative enactments could breathe life and vitality into ANCOM decisions.
Decisions depended upon voluntary good faith application and enforcement.1 77 No mechanism, outside of negotiations within
ANCOM's deliberating bodies, existed for dispute resolution, and no
provisions authorized the imposition of sanctions for violations of decisions. The Andean Court Treaty grants the Court power and authority
to interpret the norms of the Cartagena Agreement and subsequent Decisions, including D24. The Treaty also provides for the imposition of
sanctions for continuing violations. The Court "marked the final step
in the formation of the institutions necessary for the proper supervision
and enforcement of a regional integration scheme."' 7 8 Although not
yet active, a court with these broad powers has important implications
for D24.
The Treaty provides that the Court shall have five judges with one
judge from each nation elected to it." 9 Each judge must be of high
moral character and professional qualifications.' 8 0 Their functions require that they independently implement their responsibilities and that
they restrict their other activities.'
Article 9 allows each judge a sixyear term.
Essentially, the Court, when fully operational, will perform two
main functions. First, it will review Andean Commission and
ANCOM Junta rulings and decide on their compatibility with the Cartagena Agreement.' 2 Second, it will interpret ANCOM Decisions.' 3
In light of wide divergences existing in D24's application the interpretation function acquires a particular importance. The Court could nul175. Andean Court Treaty, supra note 10.
176. Id See also Rose, Latin American Economic Integration, II Lw AM. 521 (1979).
177. Note, The Role oftheAndean Court in ConsolidatingRegional Integration Efforts, 10
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 351, 361 (1980).

178.
179.
180.
181.

Id at 351.
Andean Court Treaty, supra note 10, art. 7.
Id
Id

182. Id art. 17.
183. Id art. 28.
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lify acts of the Andean Junta or Commission which either violate the
Cartagena Agreement or are ultra vires.'8 4 The Treaty permits natural
or juridical persons the right to sue before the Court if they challenge
the Act as both applicable to them and causing them harm.' 8 5 The
Court could also hear actions of non-compliance with Andean Pact Decisions brought by the Andean Junta or Commission or on the complaint of another member country. 186 If the Court finds noncompliance it will instruct compliance by the errant country. 8 7 In the
event the noncomplying member does not correct itself within three
months the Court carries the burden of determining "the limits within
which the compliant country, or any other member country, may restrict or suspend, totally or partially, the advantages deriving from the
Cartagena Agreement which benefit the non-complying country."'' 88
The Court's determination may take the form of a sanction against the
offending country.
Sanctions may include denying preferential access to certain goods
entering the regional market and restricting trade advantages from the
offending country. 8 9 If compliance is not voluntary, however, a major
argument might develop between the offending country and the other
members. 190 For that reason the Court will probably apply sanctions
sparingly and selectively with a view toward establishing incentives for
the offending countries to comply with the norms. Fashioning such a
remedy requires walking a tightrope between overly prohibitive sanctions and minimal sanctions that the country could ignore. A solution
may involve restricting regional trade advantages from one or two key
national products which enter the regional market but leaving other
products unaffected. This sanction could be enforced by removing
those products from the list of products that have preferential access to
the markets of the other members nations. Of course, as in any regional grouping there is a problem of enforcing a decision when a nation finds that decision repugnant to its national interest. ANCOM
must hope that its members find it in their interest to abide by the
Court's decisions and to continue reaping benefits from the integration
movement.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.

Id.
Id.
Id
Id
Id

art. 17.
art. 19.
arts. 23, 24.
arts. 24, 25.
art. 25.

BUSINESS INTERNATIONAL CORP., OPERATING IN LATIN AMERICA'S INTEGRATING

MARKETS 28 (1977) [hereinafter cited as INTEGRATING MARKETS].

190. Id at 29.
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Article 29 allows national judges with cases requiring interpretation of norms the option of petitioning the Court for its interpretation
of the norms in issue.' 9 ' The national judge must then "adopt the interpretation of the Court." 192 The Court may exert its greatest influence through the rendering of these advisory opinions.
The Court's power, however, is not all encompassing. It does not
have the power to annul internal laws of a country at variance with
regional norms as embodied in the Cartagena Agreement. It can
merely require amendment of the variant laws. 93 Article 30 states that
the Court may not interpret a member's domestic laws or judge the
substantive facts of a case, but may only define "the content and scope
of the norms of the juridical structure of the Cartagena Agreement." 94
The Court may also pre-judicially interpret the norms and regulations governing the Cartagena Agreement.195 The object of this ability
is to ensure that all norms and regulations are applied consistently in
the territory of each member nation. 96 The Treaty's introduction
states "that both the stability of the Cartagena Agreement and the
rights and obligations deriving from it must be safeguarded by a juridical entity.

. .

with the authority to define communitarian law, resolve

' 97
the controversies which arise under it, and to interpret it uniformly.'
This goal, if implemented, should go a long way toward relieving investor hesitancy caused by the vicissitudes of D24's application. The
Court could clearly define investors' rights under D24. Additionally, a
stable investment climate governed by clear and uniform regional restrictions on foreign investment will help alleviate threats of both sudden changes in investment law brought on by political transitions and
outright expropriations. Presumably a consistent application of the
fade-out rules, which assure eventual national control, would also discourage members from taking any further steps such as expropriation,
which may make investors wary. Although not all the problems stem-

ming from D24' 98 can be solved by the Court, investors may tolerate

D24's regulations, applied more predictably and uniformly, in return
for access to ANCOM's large regional market.
191. Andean Court Treaty, supra note 10, art. 29.
192. Id art. 31.
193. INTEGRATING MARKETS, supra note 189, at 29.
194. Andean Court Treaty, supra note 10, art. 30.
195. Id art. 28.
196. Venezuelan Congress Approved Andean Court of Justice, 3 ANDEAN GROUP (1983)
[hereinafter cited as Venezuelan Congress].
197. Andean Court Treaty, supra note 10, introduction 1 4.
198. See infra notes 205-07 and accompanying text.
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The Court will probably not have a large body of law developed
until the 1990s, and while it is still too early to tell what the Court's
impact on D24 will be, it appears that it will strengthen D24's effectiveness. In September 1982, Presidents from the five Andean Pact members agreed "to accelerate as much as possible the procedures required
to enable the Tribunal of Justice,

. .

. to be set up as soon as possi-

ble."' 199 The Venezuelan Congress, in 1983, enacted a law under which
it ratified the Treaty establishing the Andean Court of Justice. 200 Three
instruments with the Andean
months after Venezuela files its ratifying
20
Junta the Treaty will come into effect. '
XI.

TOWARD THE FUTURE

Added stability and predictability introduced into D24 can foster
the investor confidence needed for a steady flow of foreign investment
into the region. Following Chile's departure in 1976, ANCOM demonstrated the flexibility and desire to keep D24 viable in the face of
changed world economic conditions.20 2 Establishing the Andean Court
of Justice also demonstrated renewed commitment to D24 and to the
common goal of applying D24's provisions uniformly throughout the
Pact. A uniform, predictable application of D24 reduces the chances of
expropriations or nationalizations once an enterprise resides in the region. This is important since as the nations attract investment under
D24, any Draconian actions, such as an expropriation, could so unsettle potential foreign investors as to dry up any further foreign capital
sources. Under D24, however, foreign investment will meet national
priorities and yield to national owners and the impetus for expropriations disappears. The Andean stake in clarifying D24's norms so that
foreign investors can confidently and knowledgeably invest capital in
the region is high, and the nations are responding with flexibility and
commitment.
ANCOM since its inception has recognized that D24 must provide
a regulatory scheme that allows both transnational companies (the major investors in the Andean countries) and the countries themselves to
obtain "adequate, equal and fair benefits."2 3 At a "Round Table"
199. Sixth State of the Nation Report, 28 COMERClO EXTERIOR DE MExIco 338 (1982)
(English ed.).
200. Venezuelan Congress,supra note 196, at 1.
201. Id at 2.
202. See supra text accompanying note 146-52.
andLatinAmerican Integration, 11 ANDEAN GROUP 1, 1-2
203. TransnationalEnterprises

(Aug. 1978).
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conference in which Andean nations and transnational companies participated, the companies issued a statement expressing the view that
"the different cooperation systems and economic integration existing in
the region are an essential tool in improving the standard of living in
the region and in promoting the rapid, harmonious and sustained
growth of the Latin American countries." 2' Continued cooperation
and understanding between transnational companies and Andean nations is a prerequisite to D24's long-term success.
D24, however, raises some problems and questions, as yet unanswered, which may concern investors. The non-uniform implementation of the Code in each country causes investor confusion and creates
the appearance of an unstable investment environment. The reason is
that ANCOM's main legislative body cannot bind the members to its
decisions but must await national legislative enactment of each Decision's provisions. Similarly, the Code's conspicuous lack of guidelines
setting forth mechanisms or standards to apply the provisions contributes to an appearance of instability. For example, foreign investors
may question whether they are entitled to compensation under the
Code if they fail to find an acceptable buyer for their majority interest
as required by the fade-out provision.20 5 If they cannot locate a willing
buyer they will lose favorable trade concessions. The Court of Justice
will be called upon to answer these concerns. Negotiated joint ventures
with national investors, however, provide the best avoidance of this
problem at present.
Another question arises because D24 does not explain the status of
earnings retained as a result of the remittance and reinvestment limits.
Those are the profits earned by the investor over and above the amount
that can be remitted to the investor's country of origin. Most likely the
corporation will hold the excess profits in trust until it can permissibly
remit them. The Code also fails to provide a sufficient guarantee of
foreign exchange to cover remittance or repatriation.'
Additionally,
the Code offers no concrete assurance against expropriation and exacerbates this problem by providing that foreign investors shall not be
granted more favorable treatment than national investors. 2 7 It is un204. TransnationalCompaniesandRegionalIntegration, 12 ANDEAN GROUP 1,2-3 (Sept.
1978).
205. Golbert & Gingold, Latin American Economic Integratiom An Orerriewof Trade
andInvestment Developments in ANCOM, CA CM,and LA FT4A, 7 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. &

COM. 183, 198-99 (1979-80).
206. Id

207. D24, supra note 5, Declaration 4.
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clear whether the Code requires adherence to international standards
regarding treatment of foreign property or less stringent national standards. Investors should realize these potential problems and mitigate
them, possibly through negotiations, before committing investments.
ANCOM also has an incentive to alleviate these problems and thereby
relieve investor fears. Failure to do so will compromise efforts to attract foreign investment geared toward national development needs
and will negate one of ANCOM's major attractions to foreign investors, favorable access to ANCOM's markets.
On the other hand, Chile only now is discovering the results of its
open door policy toward foreign investment. On the positive side Chile
attracted foreign investment into vital sectors of the economy which
showed little growth in the post-Allende period.20 8 These sectors,
though, could have been opened up under the provisions of D24 and
are mainly geared for a world market rather than a local Chilean market. 0 9 Other sectors, most notably manufacturing, however, showed
less success after the withdrawal in attracting foreign investment and
may even be suffering as a result of Chile's small national market and
low external tariffs. 210 By allowing unrestricted foreign investment into
crucial sectors of the economy, Chile promotes a reestablishment of the
ties of dependence rejected by the ANCOM nations. 21' This return to
dependence may in the long run cause severe social and economic upheavals in Chile if it becomes clear that national priorities have been
subordinated to the priorities of foreign investors.
DL1748 may yield to a more restrictive statute governing foreign
investment as Chile grapples with its economic crisis. Areas ready for
and requiring regulation include remittance limitations, foreign exchange access, and investment into vital economic sectors.212 These areas have an immediate impact on Chile's economic health. In the
future Chile may find it advantageous to open up closer relations with
ANCOM. If it hopes to develop an evenly industrialized infrastructure, access to ANCOM's market may provide the best opportunity. In
that way Chile could expand its manufacturing sector and assure itself
208. See supra text accompanying notes 116-19. The sectors include mining and
communications.
209. See supra notes 113-14 and accompanying text.
210. See Investing in Chile,supra note 76, at 366. The low external tariff encourages the
growth of imports which stunts the growth of import substituting domestic manufacturing
enterprises and encourages those sectors able to compete in the world market as exports
(e.g., mining products).
211. See supra note 145 and accompanying text.
212. See supra text accompanying notes 122-26, 138-40.
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of a market for the goods produced. In the future, as ANCOM develops solid norms for D24 and continues attracting investment, Chile
may even be lured back into the Pact. The Andean Parliament recently
expressed the belief that "in a not so far future Chile would again integrate the Andean community."21 3 This, however, probably will not occur as long as Chile remains committed to a laissez-faire economic
philosophy which flagrantly conflicts with D24's regulations.
XII.

CONCLUSION

A foreign investment code necessarily plays only a small part in
the overall development strategy of any nation. By regulating foreign
investment, however, nations can begin to eliminate its adverse effects,
such as dependency, and establish national control over development.
The five Andean nations which subscribe to D24 have attempted to
take their developmental destiny into their own hands and out of the
hands of self-interested foreign investors. Inevitably, this process yields
results slowly and the results it does yield do not always meet expectations. These nations still depend on foreign capital which they need to
build their economies to a level that can meet the demands of their
people. As this Note demonstrates, however, D24 provides a regulatory framework which channels foreign investment to priority sectors
of the economy and which reduces the overall control foreign investors
can exert over the nation and economy. The Code also supplies legal
mechanisms which mandate that nationals must eventually control
projects begun with foreign capital and which limits the profits a foreign investor can remit to his or her country of origin. In practice D24
has not proved overly restrictive and foreign capital still flows into the
region.214 Insofar as foreign investment plays a role in a nation's development strategy, D24 provides a workable model for regulating that
investment.
Chile enacted a foreign investment code which minimizes the regulation of foreign investment. Foreign investment plays a primary role
in Chile's development strategy. Chile therefore legally opened its
doors to foreign capital and allowed an almost unimpeded flow of foreign capital into the country. As this Note showed, Chile did not provide DL600 or its amendment with legal mechanisms designed to
channel foreign capital into priority sectors or to assure that foreign
investment did not subvert national development blueprints or to con213. Andean ParliamentSupported IntegrationProcess, 3 ANDEAN GROUP 4 (1983).
214. See supra notes 156-160 and accompanying text.
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trol the remittance of profits out of the country. It appears that Chile
made foreign investment itself a developmental priority. By doing so
Chile turned its back on the ANCOM Foreign Investment Code experience and forged a path which could lead to unbalanced development
and extreme dependence on its foreign investor benefactors.

